Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2013

Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Nan D. Hunter, et
al., Addressing the Merits in Support of
Respondents
Nan D. Hunter
Georgetown University Law Center, ndh5@law.georgetown.edu

Suzanne B. Goldberg
Columbia Law School

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228872
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb/72

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons

No. 12-307
================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
--------------------------------- --------------------------------UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,

v.

EDITH SCHLAIN WINDSOR AND
BIPARTISAN LEGAL ADVISORY GROUP OF THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Respondents.
--------------------------------- --------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Second Circuit
--------------------------------- --------------------------------BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE PROFESSORS
NAN D. HUNTER, SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG,
KATHRYN ABRAMS, KATHERINE M. FRANKE,
BURT NEUBORNE, AND ANGELA P. HARRIS
ADDRESSING THE MERITS
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
--------------------------------- --------------------------------NAN D. HUNTER
Counsel of Record
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
LAW CENTER
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 662-9399
ndh5@law.georgetown.edu

SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
435 West 116th Street
New York, New York 10027
(212) 854-0411
sgoldb1@law.columbia.edu

Attorneys for Amici Curiae
================================================================
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

iii

INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE...............

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................

1

ARGUMENT ........................................................

5

I.

Multiple Forms of Invidious Classifications,
Including Those Not Traditionally Deemed
Suspect, Such as Those Based on Sexual
Orientation, Necessitate a More Transparent Statement of the Court’s Existing
Equal Protection Jurisprudence ................

5

A. Footnote 4’s Scalable Framework
Reflects the Court’s Understanding,
Reinforced by Experience, that Invidious Classifications Can Arise in a
Wide Range of Contexts ......................

7

B. The Social Complexity of Today’s
America Illustrates the Enduring
Wisdom of Footnote 4’s Open-Ended
Approach .............................................. 11
C. Principles of Transparency and Judicial Accountability Also Support the
Wisdom of Revisiting and Simplifying
the Standard of Equal Protection
Review ................................................. 14
II.

Invidious Classifications Should and Do
Trigger a More Contextual Inquiry than
the Sharply Dichotomous Tiered Framework Can Provide ...................................... 15

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
III.

When a Classification Exhibits the Indicia
of Invidiousness, Courts Examine Whether
It Is Discontinuous with, or Creates a
Burden that Is Disproportionate to, Its
Purported Neutral Justification ................ 25
A. Meaningful Review of a Classification
with the Indicia of Prejudice or Stereotypes Requires Inquiry into the Law’s
Purpose and the Relationship Between
Legislative Goals and the Basis for the
Classification under Challenge ........... 26
B. Laws That Impose a Burden out of
Proportion to the Legislative Goal,
Based on Classifications with the Markings of Invidiousness, Also Violate the
Equal Protection Clause ...................... 28

IV.

DOMA Fails Any Level of Equal Protection
Review ....................................................... 31

CONCLUSION..................................................... 39
APPENDIX .......................................................... App. 1

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995) .................................................17
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission of Webster County,
488 U.S. 336 (1989) .................................................25
Armour v. City of Indianapolis,
132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012) .............................................20
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) ....................6, 8, 9
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996) .................................................31
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ...............................18
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ...............30
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)..................32
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263 (1993) .................................................18
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).......................29
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) ...............................26
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) .................18
Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning,
455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) .....................................5
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).......28, 30
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) ......................................... passim

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) .............................3
Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) ....................................32
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) .......27, 28
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ...............30
Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL
518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) ....................37
Farber v. City of Paterson,
440 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006) .....................................18
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) .....6, 8, 9
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307 (1993) ...........................................22, 23
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) .............38
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) ...............18
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) .........................30
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) .............................38
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) ...................17
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) .............5
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,
472 U.S. 612 (1985) .................................................20
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) ....... 26
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) ...........5, 19, 32
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).........................30
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) ...................20

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) .................................................20
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) ..................................20
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) .............7
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,
470 U.S. 869 (1985) .................................................20
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ........6, 8, 9, 10
National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v.
Minister of Home Affairs, 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) ........35
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979) .................................................18
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) .......................6, 8
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ...................6, 8
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) ......................26
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) ............................17
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 (1991) .....................................................38
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) ......................26
Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management,
881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012) ........................5
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).............5
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) ....................................16

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) ................................... 6, 9, 10, 11
Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)..................................35
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ....................15
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ........................28, 38
Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989).........................29
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) ......................25
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) ................. passim
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, IX Eur.
Ct. H.R. 309 (1999) .................................................13
San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) ........................ 3, 20, 29
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo,
404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005) ................................24
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) ..................26
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ...............38
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) .................................................29
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) ............................37
South Carolina State Highway Department v.
Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177 (1938)..... 7, 8, 9, 10
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) ...........................31

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
345 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1972) ..............................34
U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973) ......................... 16, 23, 24, 27, 34
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938) ......................................... passim
United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974) .................................................13
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) ..........16
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) ...................22, 23
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562 (2000) .................................................21
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ........20
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972) ...........................................35, 36
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) ..........35
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938) ..........................18
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985)....................20
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) .................................................16
Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) ........................... 5, 21, 22
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) ........................20

viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
STATUTES
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) .......................................12
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006) ..........................................17
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (2011) ......................12
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2006) ...............................12
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 ..................................................13
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Associated Press, Wife of Female Army Officer
Can Join Spouses Club, USA Today (Jan. 26,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/01/26/army-military-bragg-gay/
1866019/ ..................................................................34
Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 Yale L.J.
965 (1997) ................................................................ 11
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review (1980) ..................... 10, 11
European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ...............................13
Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United
States, The Williams Institute (2013), http://
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf..................................36
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers,
77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481 (2004) ...................................17

ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution,
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 217 (1995) ................................. 11
Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto
R. Ramirez, U.S. Census Bureau, Overview
of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010 (2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/
c2010br-02.pdf .........................................................12
Pew Forum Religion & Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (Feb. 2008), http://
religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religiouslandscape-study-full.pdf .........................................12
Laura B. Shrestha & Elayne J. Heisler, Cong.
Research Serv., RL 32701, The Changing
Demographic Profile of the United States
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL32701.pdf.2011 ...........................................12
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 14 (1996) .................21
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1944-45 (66th ed. 1945) ..................12
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1948 (69th ed. 1948) .......................12

1
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are legal scholars with expertise in
equal protection jurisprudence. Although amici support heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation-based
classifications under the extant, tiered framework,
they believe that the framework proposed here will
enhance the clarity and accuracy of equal protection
review, given the ever-increasing demographic and
social complexity of the United States in the twentyfirst century.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court is at a crossroads in its equal protection jurisprudence. The problem lies not in what the
Court has done in analyzing legislative classifications
of groups of persons, but in the murkiness that has
surrounded the articulation of which analytical principles apply when invidious classifications are not
traditionally suspect. As our Nation becomes ever
1

All parties have consented to the filing of all amicus
curiae briefs by letters filed with the Clerk of Court. No counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. In addition, no
persons or entities other than amici curiae, or their counsel
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of the brief.
Names of individual amici appear in the Appendix to this
brief.

2
more diverse, the confusion for lower courts and the
political branches generated by this lack of clarity
will only worsen.
Building on precedents dating back to Carolene
2
Products Footnote 4, there is a clear path forward for
situations in which courts must examine group-based
classifications that correlate with social stigma. Like
Footnote 4, the analysis must be grounded in the
particular facts surrounding a classification, recognizing that context often determines meaning. And by
examining a classification in context, the review can
be flexible enough to accommodate increasing social
pluralism in American life as it evolves in ways that
we cannot foresee.
Amici agree that deferential equal protection
review is often appropriate because classification is
intrinsic to governance, and most distinctions made
in the context of economic and social policy merit
judicial restraint. As is evident from precedent, however, the decisive factor for determining the stringency of review is not whether a policy is “economic or
social” but whether the classification itself is tainted
with prejudice or is patently arbitrary. When social
prejudice is present, Footnote 4 and its progeny
necessitate an appropriately searching judicial inquiry into whether the burdens imposed on a politically vulnerable minority are discontinuous with, and
2

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).

3
disproportional to, the neutral public goals, if any,
that are asserted as the purposes of the legislation.
In many respects, Justices Stevens and Marshall
were surely correct that there is only one Equal
Protection Clause, under which judicial review inevitably operates along a spectrum.3 But a sliding scale,
without more, does not provide a workable method for
adjudication. The Court has the opportunity now to
make explicit what has become muddied: that all
classifications with the indicia of invidiousness trigger a more searching inquiry than the standard of
“deference” would imply. Traits that have already
been marked for either strict or heightened scrutiny
easily fit within this broader principle; indeed, the
very design of the upper tiers aims to capture those
classifications most likely to be invidious.
The sharp “all or nothing” dichotomy between
classifications that are always or never suspicious no
longer works in contemporary America as social dynamics and demographics have become increasingly
complex. In response, amici propose a unifying,
3

See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (“There is only one Equal Protection Clause.”);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[This Court] has applied a
spectrum of standards . . . [that] clearly comprehends variations
in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications, depending . . . on the constitutional
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and
the recognized invidiousness of the basis . . . [of ] the particular
classification.”).

4
coherent two-part equal protection test, which distinguishes between classifications that have the indicia
of invidiousness and those that do not. The proposed
test asks:
Is the classification based on a trait that is
associated with a broad or historical pattern
of social prejudice, animus, or stereotyping or
a trait that, as evidenced by the surrounding
political context, is associated with acute
political or social vulnerability?; and
If yes, does the classification impose a
burden that is discontinuous with, or disproportionate to, its purported neutral justification?
Per Footnote 4, more searching review follows for
classifications that are likely to be invidious, while
more deferential review applies to the rest.
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) fails equal
protection review under both the current and proposed
tests. But because the more contextual approach
presented here will be more capable of application to
new situations, while also enhancing transparency
and judicial accountability, amici urge its consideration in this case.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

5
ARGUMENT
I.

Multiple Forms of Invidious Classifications,
Including Those Not Traditionally Deemed
Suspect, Such as Those Based on Sexual
Orientation, Necessitate a More Transparent Statement of the Court’s Existing
Equal Protection Jurisprudence.

The lower federal courts and the parties to this
case disagree on many points, but none is so central
as the identification of which standard of review
should apply to classifications based on sexual orientation.4 The choice between deferential rational basis
review, with its presumption that the statute at issue
is constitutional, and heightened scrutiny, with its
4

Since this Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 583-85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (plurality opinion),
which found laws criminalizing sexual conduct between samesex partners unconstitutional, federal courts have struggled
with identifying the correct standard for sexual orientation
classifications. Some have applied heightened scrutiny, see, e.g.,
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), or stated they believe it applies,
see, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294,
333 (D. Conn. 2012). Many have utilized a more searching
rational basis standard under which DOMA and other laws have
been found unconstitutional, see, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052, 1081 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). Finally, other federal courts have
used a rational basis standard under which sexual orientation
classifications have been upheld. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal
Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (referring to
equal protection standard for sexual orientation classifications
as “murky”).

6
presumption that the challenged form of discrimination is illegitimate, has not only become a doctrinal
sorting mechanism but is also often seen as a proxy
for moral judgment. Especially in cases, such as this
one, that involve highly contentious social issues that
tend to intensify public perceptions about what is at
stake, it is important that the analytic process be
forthright, with a framework that provides objective
referents for assessing classifications.
The Court has long recognized that the rich
diversity of the American population necessitates an
equal protection standard that can accommodate
forms of discrimination that were not specifically
envisaged by the Reconstruction Framers. In United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
the Court articulated enduring principles for when
the judiciary analyzes
whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington
v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon . . .: Nixon v. Condon
. . .: whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities.
Id. at 153 n.4. These situations, the Court wrote, “may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial

7
inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 428; S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177, 184, n.2, and cases cited.” Id.
While Footnote 4 is most often invoked for its
concern with “discrete and insular minorities,” a close
reading reinforces that its reach is far broader. Id.
Examining Footnote 4’s text, in its context, establishes
that today’s Court, in our context, must apply
“a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”
whenever invidious classifications target a trait
reflecting either historical or acute contemporary
stigma for burdens that are discontinuous with, and
disproportional to, the neutral public goals, if any,
that are asserted as the purposes of the legislation.
Id.
A. Footnote 4’s Scalable Framework Reflects the Court’s Understanding, Reinforced by Experience, that Invidious
Classifications Can Arise in a Wide
Range of Contexts.
Footnote 4 establishes a scalable framework for
analyzing invidious classifications that recent history
has only made more necessary and that this Court
has embraced, both explicitly for classifications now
recognized as suspect and implicitly for more complex
forms of discrimination.
In its first modern explication of the standards
for judicial scrutiny of legislative classifications, this
Court highlighted examples involving discrimination

8
based on characteristics that were disfavored in their
particular time and place, in addition to characteristics, such as race,5 that have been the enduring
subjects of disfavor and were later labeled as suspect
6
or quasi-suspect. These other examples included
persons who were geographic outsiders in a particular state even though not members of an otherwise
stigmatized group,7 Americans of German descent in
8
the wake of World War I, and Asian-Americans in the
9
Hawaiian Islands. In each instance, the need for
close judicial attention arose from a context in which
unpopular minorities were saddled with disproportionate burdens.

5

Two of the cited cases involved African-Americans whose
voting rights were blocked in Texas Democratic Party primary
elections. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
6
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
7
S.C. State Highway, 303 U.S. 177. In Barnwell, the Court
wrote:
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose
purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an
advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding
advantage to those within, have been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though
Congress has not acted.
Id. at 184-85 n.2.
8
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa,
262 U.S. 404 (1923).
9
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).

9
The cases cited in Footnote 4 regarding ethnic
minorities grew out of a campaign against those
groups that occurred in the United States between
the world wars, a tool of which was to “bring foreign
language schools under a strict governmental control.” Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298. In Meyer, the Court
struck down a 1919 Nebraska statute forbidding the
teaching of German to students before the eighth
grade, overriding “[t]he desire of the Legislature to
foster a homogeneous people,” 262 U.S. at 402, but
the state then enacted a near-identical statute in
1921. In Bartels, the Court ruled that the newer
Nebraska law, in addition to similar laws from Ohio
and Iowa, was unconstitutional. 262 U.S. at 409-11.
When a 1922 Oregon statute prohibiting all private
schools was challenged, state officials declined to
defend it. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533
(1925). In the last case in the series, the Court in
Farrington invalidated a law that would have prohibited significant instruction in Asian languages,
primarily Japanese. 273 U.S. at 297-99.
By contrast, Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177 (1938),
addressed the issue of legislative action imposing a
burden on interstate commerce. The Court clarified
that even in an ordinary commercial regulation, an
invidious distinction disadvantaging geographic and
political outsiders could be invalid. As the Court
explained, “when the regulation is of such a character
that its burden falls principally upon those without
the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected
to those political restraints which are normally

10
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some
interests within the state.” Id. at 185 n.2. In Barnwell, the Court also cited numerous other cases that
similarly underscored the need for courts to be attentive when reviewing legislative burdens that “fall[ ]
principally” upon a group that, for whatever reasons,
is relatively vulnerable in the political process. Id.10
These and other Footnote 4 citations illustrate
the 1938 Court’s understanding that oppressive laws
could vary in their specific manifestations of invidiousness. For some, such as the cases addressing restrictions on foreign language education, their placement
in Footnote 4 foreshadows the more stringent scrutiny applied when invidiousness and an important
interest co-exist. Indeed, Meyer and Pierce are now
understood primarily as liberty, rather than equality,
10

The portion of Footnote 4 that cited Barnwell articulated
the political process concern of the Court’s Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence:
The Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 provides
simply that Congress shall have the power to regulate
commerce among the states. But early on the Supreme
Court gave this provision a self-operating dimension
as well, one growing out of the same need to protect
the politically powerless . . . . By thus constitutionally
binding the interests of out-of-state manufacturers to
those of local manufacturers represented in the legislature, it provided political insurance that the taxes
imposed on the former would not rise to a prohibitive
or even an unreasonable level.
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review 83-84 (1980).

11
decisions establishing the rights of parents to control
the education of their children, even though the
context of their citation in Footnote 4 reveals that the
Court invoked them to illustrate the need to curb
discriminatory laws.11 For others, such as Barnwell,
their inclusion in Footnote 4 reinforces the Court’s
recognition that invidious prejudice can exist independently of demographic minorities.12
B. The Social Complexity of Today’s
America Illustrates the Enduring
Wisdom of Footnote 4’s Open-Ended
Approach.
The importance of heeding the wisdom of Footnote
4’s approach has become more, not less, urgent with
time. The United States in 1938 had a far less diverse
population than it has today, as is evident even from
the data regarding only the most prominent demographic groups, which shows exponential shifts in the
11

The text of Footnote 4 identifies the law at issue in Pierce
as an example of discrimination against religious minorities,
although the language of the opinion does not make explicit that
aspect of the case.
12
See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 107 Yale L.J. 965, 1005 (1997) (“In a long list
of later cases [after Carolene Products], the Court continued to
consider the impact of ‘interest group participation’ in assessing
legislation under the dormant Commerce Clause.”); see also Lisa
Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev.
217, 251-52 (1995) (“The political process leading to the enactment of laws that discriminate against outside commerce is an
important theme of the Court’s decisions . . . .”).

12
breadth of racial and religious identifications of
Americans.13 Nor is the trend toward a multicultural
nation, with an accompanying wide range of interests
and identities, likely to diminish.14
This growth in demographic diversity at a time
when social movements have been similarly expansive
has generated a wider range of cross-cutting identities and interests than ever before. Indeed, antidiscrimination laws provide evidence of some of these
shifts, with new laws enacted in recent decades to
respond to discrimination based on numerous aspects
of identity not traditionally designated as suspect.
At the federal level, for example, laws now prohibit
employment discrimination based on age, disability,
and information about genetic predispositions.15 Some
state legislatures have taken even broader note of
13

Compare, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1948, at 19 (69th ed. 1948) with Karen R.
Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. Ramirez, U.S. Census
Bureau, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010, at 7 tbl.3
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/
c2010br-02.pdf; see also Pew Forum on Religion & Pub. Life, U.S.
Religious Landscape Survey 5 (Feb. 2008), available at http://
religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.
pdf.
14
See Laura B. Shrestha & Elayne J. Heisler, Cong.
Research Serv., RL 32701, The Changing Demographic Profile
of the United States 12 tbl.2 (2011), available at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32701.pdf.
15
See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (2011); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
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types of discrimination not envisioned in 1938. In
Edith Windsor’s home state of New York, for example,
the human rights law also covers “sexual orientation,
military status, . . . marital status, [and] domestic
violence victim status.”16
Yet while many governments have expanded the
bases for statutory protection as just described, laws
such as these cannot keep pace with the exponential
increase in diversity, the dynamics of contemporary
social formation, and, as a result of these changes,
the burgeoning array of equal protection claims that
come before the federal courts.17 Cf. United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“As our society
has become more complex, our numbers more vast, our
lives more varied, and our resources more strained,
citizens increasingly request the intervention of the
16

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 2010).
Other Western democracies are experiencing the same
kinds of change, and they, too, face challenges in revising
antidiscrimination law to continue to fulfill its purposes. The
European Convention on Human Rights, for example, denominates more categories for protection against discrimination than
have been designated for strict or heightened scrutiny under the
Constitution, but courts nonetheless continue to employ reasoning by analogy in order to retain the relevance of the antidiscrimination principle. European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
14, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (prohibiting discrimination “on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status”), interpreted in
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 309
(1999), to also include sexual orientation.
17
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courts on a greater variety of issues than at any
period of our national development.”).
C. Principles of Transparency and Judicial
Accountability Also Support the Wisdom
of Revisiting and Simplifying the Standard of Equal Protection Review.
Clarifying the framework that underlies equal
protection review will enhance, not undermine, the
jurisprudence of restraint. A test like the one proposed here, which makes explicit the inquiries that
are implicit in the Court’s cases, will streamline equal
protection review in a way that is more responsive
than the existing tiered framework to the surrounding
environment of classifications. Lower courts particularly will benefit as they face an increasing stream of
classifications that are not traditionally suspect but
may warrant more searching review consistent with
the longstanding commitments articulated in Footnote 4.
Clearer guidance will also reinforce the importance of judicial restraint. The great fear associated
with equal protection review is that courts will arbitrarily impose normative and policy preferences,
rather than evaluate classifications based on principled consideration of objective referents. The process
of articulating reasons why a classification may or
may not be invidious in a particular factual context
that is attentive to both stigma and burden, as
required by the framework proposed by amici here,
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will itself help screen out problematic rationalizations.
Justice Stevens’ forceful statement in Cleburne of
the logic behind approaching equal protection review
as a spectrum is consistent with, but less precise than,
the approach presented here. See City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring). Amici suggest framing the
inquiries in a way that will implement the normative
aspirations of the Equal Protection Clause, while also
providing administrative workability.
II.

Invidious Classifications Should and Do
Trigger a More Contextual Inquiry than
the Sharply Dichotomous Tiered Framework Can Provide.

No obligation of the sovereign is more fundamental than the duty to govern impartially, relying on
legitimate and neutral criteria, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
452 (Stevens, J., concurring), and to eschew assignment of burdens and benefits based on status – based
on “who someone is.” Our “Constitution ‘neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’ ” Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Therefore, regardless of the standard
applied or the designated tier of review, this Court
has repeatedly found that the markings of invidious
discrimination must trigger meaningful examination.
Indeed, invidious line drawing is the exception to the
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principle of deference to legislative bodies in all equal
protection review. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (sustaining a
law on legislative deference grounds), with U.S. Dep’t
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)
(refusing to defer to the legislature where an illegitimate interest underlay the classification at issue).
And the jurisprudence makes clear that legislatures
cross that threshold when they differentiate among
constituents “for the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law,” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
Over time, this Court has catalogued the clearest
and most odious kinds of prejudicial classifications
into the tiered approach to equal protection analysis.
Race, for example, “is the paradigm” of “classifications [that] in themselves supply a reason to infer
antipathy,” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272 (1979), hence its designation as suspect. The
uppermost tiers express our Nation’s evolved sense of
repugnance at the use of particular characteristics,
such as race, to differentiate among Americans. They
also implement that sense of repugnance with heightened scrutiny, which streamlines review of challenges
to disparate treatment based on those antipathyladen classifications. This more rigorous form of
review promotes administrative workability by creating the presumption that distinctions based on suspect
and quasi-suspect characteristics reflect stereotypes
about or hostility toward the burdened class. United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549-51 (1996). As the
Court has explained regarding racial classifications,
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for example, they “are simply too pernicious to permit
any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The characteristics such as race and sex that are
recognized as self-evidently suspicious do not exhaust
the potential instances of invidious legislation, however.18 As noted almost sixty years ago, although
“differences in race and color” have historically served
as markers of discrimination, “community prejudices
are not static, and from time to time other differences
from the community norm may define other groups
which need the same protection.” Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954); cf. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962) (selective enforcement violates the
Constitution if “the selection was deliberately based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion,
or other arbitrary classification” (emphasis added)).
While this shifting social reality has precluded
the formulation of one talismanic formula for equal
protection review, the Court has maintained a focus
on discerning and barring invidiousness in classifications. In interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)’s prohibition against intentional deprivations of equal
18

See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77
S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 512-13, 528-31 (2004) (reviewing cases
invalidated on invidiousness grounds and highlighting the
Court’s longstanding concern with invidious class legislation).

18
protection of the laws, for example, the Court found
that the statute’s intent requirement “means that
there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
[defendant’s] action[s].” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102 (1971). The Court then elaborated the
meaning of “invidious” in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274 (1993), citing with
approval the dictionary definition as “[t]ending to
excite odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense;
esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating.” Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Webster’s Second International Dictionary 1306 (1954)).19 The corollary term with which
“invidious” is paired in Griffin – “animus” – may in
addition reflect the insensitivity that arises from
stereotyping or from the “simple want of careful,
rational reflection.” Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
19

This Court and lower courts also have linked invidiousness to an array of terms connoting unfair discrimination. See
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting that the presumption of
validity “gives way” when statute classifications “reflect “prejudice and antipathy”); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 609 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that, if irrational,
a classification “must fall”); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the implications of
inferiority when a classification “add[s] to the burdens of an
already disadvantaged discrete minority”); Welch v. Henry, 305
U.S. 134, 144 (1938) (noting that hostility toward a group may
be impermissible). Because proof of invidiousness is an element
of a plaintiff ’s case in claims brought under § 1985(3), lower
courts are accustomed to the term. See, e.g., Farber v. City of
Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135-43 (3d Cir. 2006).
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Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The first inquiry in the framework proposed here
emerges directly in response to the Court’s concern
with invidiousness. It asks: Is the classification based
on a trait that is associated with a broad or historical
pattern of social prejudice, animus or stereotyping or a
trait that, as evidenced by the surrounding political
context, is associated with acute political or social
vulnerability?
This inquiry, with its aim to discern the potential
for invidiousness, does not require the Court to
jettison its existing structure of categories of heightened scrutiny. Those categories exist because they
reliably reflect manifestations of invidiousness that,
over long periods of time, we have come to recognize
as unacceptable in our constitutional democracy.
Invoking an anti-invidiousness principle, rather than
a list of specific characteristics, however, would
provide a better explanation of the need for meaningful review when indicia that have traditionally been
deemed suspect are not present. Justice O’Connor
reinforced this point: “When a law exhibits such a
desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis
review . . . .” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Invidious classifications will often be marked by
some of the same indicia currently associated with
heightened or strict scrutiny, such as being based on
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a trait that has been subjected to “a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ ” or having the effect of
imposing disadvantages based on “stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of [group members’]
abilities,” Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313 (1976) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). But greater flexibility will allow for more principled adjudication – based
on what the Court has already done in many cases –
of situations in which classifications may be justifiable in one context but not in another. People with
developmental disabilities, for example, may elicit
contradictory legislative responses of “irrational
prejudice”20 or solicitude,21 depending on the situation.
Residency requirements, likewise, may establish
legitimate eligibility criteria22 or may reflect “discriminat[ion] against out-of-state commerce or new
residents.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct.
2073, 2080 (2012) (characterizing Hooper v. Bernalillo
Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v.
Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); and Zobel v. Williams, 457

20

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730-32 (1997).
22
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (upholding
bona fide residency requirements for free primary and secondary
schooling); McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645,
647 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding continuing residency requirements for municipal employment against equal protection
challenge).
21

21
U.S. 55 (1982)).23 With a growing number of social
minorities, whose memberships increasingly overlap,
this flexibility is essential.
There are other, rare instances when a classification may be so arbitrary as to raise concerns about a
possible equal protection violation even though it is
not related to a socially stigmatized characteristic or
a characteristic that is otherwise disadvantaged in
the political process.24 The flexibility of the proposed
framework can also accommodate these outliers. But
the situation that has produced the greatest constitutional uncertainty has been where courts are asked to
evaluate classifications based on characteristics, such
as sexual orientation, that have not formally been
designated as suspicious but which are known to be
frequently linked to stigma.25 See supra note 2. As the
23

The form of invidiousness in these cases may be described
as “protectionism – a desire to protect in-staters at the expense
of out-of-staters.” Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 14, 59 (1996).
24
See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65
(2000) (per curiam) (“[The] complaint can fairly be construed as
alleging that the Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot
easement as a condition of connecting her property to the
municipal water supply where the Village required only a 15foot easement from other similarly situated property owners.”);
see also id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring) (revealing that the
factual context included allegations of “ ‘vindictive action,’
‘illegitimate animus,’ and ‘ill will’ ” (citation omitted)).
25
Alternatively, amici agree with a more narrow argument
that sexual orientation classifications should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185 (finding quasisuspect class criteria satisfied “based on the weight of the
(Continued on following page)
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Court of Appeals in the instant case noted with some
understatement, “it is safe to say that there is some
doctrinal instability in this area.” Windsor, 699 F.3d
at 181.
Petitioner Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(Petitioner or BLAG) would disable this Court from
acknowledging the social realities behind varying
forms of class-based legislation by seeking an unthinking and unvarying application of the most
deferential equal protection standard. Citing cases in
which either no indicia of invidiousness were present
in the context at issue26 or in which a trait-based
classification was in fact struck down as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause,27 BLAG strings together
a series of quotes to argue that, absent strict scrutiny,
“ ‘the Constitution presumes that even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process,’ ”28 “ ‘judicial intervention is generally
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a

factors and on analogy to the classifications recognized as
suspect and quasi-suspect”).
26
Brief in Opposition at 4, Windsor v. United States, No. 12307 (U.S. cert. granted Dec. 7, 2012) (citing FCC v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993); Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979)).
27
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
28
Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 28,
Windsor v. United States, No. 12-307 (U.S. cert. granted Dec. 7,
2012) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
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political branch has acted’ ”29 and “Congress’ decision
where to draw the line is ‘virtually unreviewable.’ ”30
If these decontextualized platitudes were true, this
Court’s decisions in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer
would not – could not – exist.
To properly interpret the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court should continue its refusal to engage in
such willful blindness. Contrary to the arguments of
BLAG and its supporting amici, it need not fear that
taking account of the stigmatization and stereotyping
associated with a trait that is subjected to legislative
disadvantage will jeopardize the capacity of government to function in the future, as it has not in the
past. Markers of invidiousness rarely occur in the
mine run of legislation involving “ordinary commercial transactions.” Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.
The reformulated equal protection standard proposed here will not produce routine second-guessing
of legislative authority to regulate a wide variety of
economic and social matters. But the jurisprudential
guideline favoring restraint does not bar the Court
from taking a closer look when the classification itself
reveals that a disfavored, often small, group has been
scapegoated as the cause of broader social anxieties,
or used as fodder for the creation of a wedge issue.
Simply put, no floodgates for challenges to legislative line-drawing between landlords and tenants,
29
30

Id. (quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 97).
Id. at 30 (quoting Beach, 508 U.S. at 316).
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mortgagors and mortgagees, or cable facilities that
serve units under common or separate ownership will
swing open if this Court engages in a meaningful
inquiry into the constitutionality of the invidious
exclusion created by DOMA.
Instead, where groups are politically unpopular,
either nationally or locally – as gay people were when
Congress passed DOMA and when voters approved
Amendment 2 in Colorado; as people with developmental disabilities were when a small town in Texas
imposed uniquely burdensome zoning rules on them;
and as hippies were when the Department of Agriculture adopted its restrictive food stamp rule – the risk
of invidious classification masked by benign-sounding
rationales runs high and the most deferential forms
of review are no longer appropriate. See, e.g., Romer,
517 U.S. 620; Moreno, 413 U.S. 528; Cleburne, 473
U.S. 432.
There are times, as here, when the most salient
concern is that legislative processes may not have
operated impartially. In such situations, courts must
serve their essential function in our constitutional
democracy as the sole branch of national government
that is unelected. “[W]hen the fervor of political
passions moves the Executive and the Legislative
branches to act in ways inimical to basic constitutional principles, it is the duty of the judiciary to
intervene.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404
F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, C.J., concurring). That same duty attaches here, where Congress
has excluded one subset of married couples from the
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federal scheme of marriage recognition and regulation based on a trait that has long been subjected to
social and political disfavor.
III. When a Classification Exhibits the Indicia
of Invidiousness, Courts Examine Whether
It Is Discontinuous with, or Creates a
Burden that Is Disproportionate to, Its
Purported Neutral Justification.
Examination of the legislative purpose and the
nexus between that purpose and the classification, as
well as the relationship between the purpose and the
burden imposed by the classification, will often reveal
whether the government’s reliance on a socially
disfavored trait must be invalidated.31 A justification
that may be legitimate in the abstract, but does not
31

In a handful of cases, the Court has found that the total
absence of a legitimate purpose or a radical disconnect between
ends and means can render a law unconstitutional because a
classification is patently arbitrary, even without the indicia of
invidiousness. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty.
Comm’n of Webster Cnty., 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989) (noting
“intentional systematic undervaluation by state officials” led to
gross disparity in property tax rates (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 30809 (1966) (finding that a law requiring only those indigent
persons whose appeals were unsuccessful to repay court costs
failed to meet the standard that there must be “some rationality
in the nature of the class singled out”). Such cases are analogous
to those in which the invidiousness of a particular trait is so
clear from the face of a statute and so unrelated to ability or
merit that consideration of its relationship to the particular
legislative goal is unnecessary.
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explain why the trait in question had been singled
out for legislative burden in the particular context at
issue, will not suffice. To pass muster under the Equal
Protection Clause, a “classificatory scheme must
‘rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable
governmental objective.’ ” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 1516 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981)).
Thus the second inquiry in the framework proposed here asks: Does the classification impose a
burden that is discontinuous with, or disproportionate
to, its purported neutral justification?
A. Meaningful Review of a Classification
with the Indicia of Prejudice or Stereotypes Requires Inquiry into the Law’s
Purpose and the Relationship Between
Legislative Goals and the Basis for the
Classification under Challenge.
This Court has required that classifications reflect genuinely “legitimate public concerns,” Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); see also Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000), rather than antipathy toward a minority. When the signs of prejudice or
stereotyping are present, as they are in the case at
bar, the Court has been especially vigilant in examining the proffered rationales for the classification. See,
e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491
(2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (regarding the need
to “strike down a government classification that is
clearly intended to injure a particular class of private
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parties, with only incidental or pretextual public
justifications”).
In Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, for example, the Court
found that a ban on antidiscrimination protections for
gay people could not be justified by benign-sounding
references to cost-saving and protecting associational
rights when its actual purpose was far more likely to
have been instantiation of an inferior status. Similarly,
in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50, the Court found that
concerns about a flood plain could not explain why
homes for people with mental retardation were restricted while other group homes were not. And in
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537-38, the Court rejected superficially neutral rationales for refusing food stamps to
people living with unrelated others – a purported
government interest in stimulating agriculture and
minimizing fraud – finding that they masked an
underlying and impermissible hostility toward hippies.
Conversely, a direct relationship between a
legislative goal and the classification will bolster the
constitutionality of a law. In Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 473-75 (1970), for example, the Court
reviewed a Maryland statute that classified based on
family size in setting the amount of welfare payments
by capping the amount due any one family rather
than by calculating the amount on a per-child basis.
The Court found that the classification by family size
was “free from invidious discrimination,” id. at 487,
and legitimately grounded in the state’s interest in
encouraging employment and avoiding an end result
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that would discriminate against “families of the working poor.” Id. at 486.
B. Laws That Impose a Burden out of
Proportion to the Legislative Goal,
Based on Classifications with the
Markings of Invidiousness, Also Violate
the Equal Protection Clause.
Even where a proper fit exists between legislative ends and means, a gross disparity between the
burden created by the classification and the public
benefit that is the ostensible legislative purpose may
nonetheless doom the law. The Court has noted this
link between a disproportionate burden on a group of
people and the risk that invidious discrimination has
occurred: “If a state law disproportionately burdened
a particular class of religious observers, this circumstance might be evidence of an impermissible legislative motive.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
535 (1997).
The disproportionality principle explains cases
that otherwise appear difficult to catalog because
they involve non-suspect classifications that can be,
depending on the context, invidious, and where a
burden is imposed on a liberty interest that is important but not fundamental. In Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 202, 223 (1982), for example, the Court
noted that the immigration status of undocumented
resident children was a legitimate basis for classification, yet their exclusion from public schools would
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produce “a lifetime [of] hardship” with the “stigma of
illiteracy [that] will mark them for the rest of their
lives,” and struck down a law barring this group of
children from schools.
The Court has similarly found equal protection
violations when laws have imposed a disproportionate burden on low-income persons, although poverty
itself is not a suspect classification. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 25. Four years after Carolene Products, the
Court struck down a statute that allowed sterilization
of habitual larcenists, but not habitual embezzlers,
stressing both the heavy burden on the right to bear
children and the invidiousness of a classification so
linked to economic class. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). “When the law
lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes
one and not the other, it has made as an invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race
or nationality for oppressive treatment,” the Court
wrote. Id. When participation in government was at
stake, the Court struck another wealth-linked classification: “[I]t is a form of invidious discrimination to
require land ownership of all appointees to a body
authorized to propose reorganization of local government.” Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 107 (1989); see
also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (striking down requirement of a filing fee for candidates in
local primary elections).
In several other cases, a classification that allocated burdens in a way that further disadvantaged
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low-income persons was invalidated in light of its
impact on the criminal or civil justice system. As the
Court has explained, “[i]n criminal trials a State can
no more discriminate on account of poverty than on
account of religion, race, or color.” Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956); accord Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 355, 357-58 (1963). Although there is no
absolute constitutional right to appeal, for example,
the Court struck down economic barriers to pursuing
an appeal in both criminal and civil cases that involved important liberty interests. In Griffin, the
Court required states to furnish indigent criminal
defendants with free trial transcripts on appeal. The
same obligation was imposed for indigent appellants
in parental termination cases. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996); cf. Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (finding it unconstitutional for a state not to permit waiver of filing fees for
indigent persons in divorce cases).
The underlying principle that greater burdens
require more persuasive justifications provides one of
the anchors of constitutional jurisprudence, and is
found across multiple doctrines. In the realm of equal
protection, for example, the Court has developed a
concept of “proportionality and congruence between
the means adopted and the legitimate end to be
achieved” in assessing whether Congress has exceeded its authority in enacting remedial legislation.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. The limitation on Congress’
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause must
surely be at least matched by a comparable boundary
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to mark when Congress has violated the same provision. Similarly, under the Due Process Clause, states
have flexibility in permitting the use of punitive
damages to penalize and deter tortious conduct, but a
punitive damages award may run afoul of basic
fairness concerns if it can “fairly be categorized as
‘grossly excessive’ in relation” to those goals. BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). The
guideposts that lower courts use to determine whether
an award is grossly excessive include the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and the proportionality between the award and the harm suffered by
plaintiff. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).
In sum, the Court has brought to bear a more
searching inquiry into the logic and appropriateness
of how a legislature uses its power to classify groups
of people when there are indicia of invidiousness,
including a missing nexus between the ends and
means of a law or the imposition of a burden that is
disproportionate to the benefit that the law is likely
to convey. In doing so, the Court has recognized the
importance of calibrating the degree of stringency in
its review to importance of the constitutional values
at issue.
IV. DOMA Fails Any Level of Equal Protection
Review.
DOMA mandates the singling out of a subclass
of lawfully married persons for disqualification as
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married for purposes of any federal law. It is grounded in the invidious targeting of a socially stigmatized
minority. And the burden it imposes by depriving
married same-sex couples and their children of all
federal recognition is both discontinuous with and
disproportionate to any legitimate, neutral public purpose. DOMA thus fails any level of equal protection
review, including under the standard proposed here.
There can be no serious question about the
degree of stigma historically associated with homosexuality. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 19697 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Condemnation
of [homosexual] practices is firmly rooted in JudeaoChristian moral and ethical standards.”); cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“[F]or centuries there have
been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct
as immoral.”). As in Romer, where the Court found
that the primary purpose of the law was discrimination per se, in this case, one way to reveal the invidiousness at work is to ask whether DOMA’s exclusion
would have been enacted if any group of married
heterosexual couples were subject to it: for example,
couples beyond child-bearing age or in which one or
both partners had been sterilized. This inquiry does
not probe whether the law could be more perfectly
attuned to the stated purpose, but rather whether the
law would have ever been enacted at all without its
invidious distinction. “Our salvation is the Equal
Protection Clause, which requires the democratic
majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones
what they impose on you and me.” Cruzan v. Dir. of
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Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring). The extreme unlikelihood that such a
law regulating recognition of marriages would affect
anyone except same-sex couples demonstrates the
extreme likelihood that the primary purpose behind
this exclusion was simply to exclude this particular
group.
Nor can BLAG identify genuinely neutral purposes served by DOMA’s exclusion of this one group of
couples. Rather, DOMA’s effect is to impose harsh and
unnecessary burdens that are not justified by a
legitimate purpose but instead simply deny these
persons access to the federal programs that track the
obligations of interdependency to which they are
already being held under state law.
BLAG’s primary assertion appears to be that the
federal government can limit its recognition of existing marriage to relationships most associated with
procreative capacity – even if only hypothetically. Yet
DOMA’s broad scope sweeps across hundreds of
statutes (and perhaps thousands of regulations) that
shape a wide range of substantive policy areas.
Consequently, there is striking discontinuity between
DOMA’s breadth and its purported interests, whether
in procreation and parenting, uniformity, or any of
BLAG’s other implausibly hypothesized purposes. Its
enormous impact also highlights how out of proportion its burden is to any likely public benefit.
For example, the desire to police the definition of
marriage because of its association with procreation
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bears little relationship to the many social welfare
laws affected by DOMA. There is simply no link between child-raising and many of the federal programs
that DOMA forecloses, such as immigration categories, surviving spouse benefits, and health insurance
and pension benefits for the spouses of federal employees, as well as countless collateral programs unrelated to procreation in which DOMA itself is generating
32
new instances of gratuitous discrimination.
In general, the structure of benefits programs is
not a proper venue for federal resolution of a competition among states over differing definitions of
marriage or beliefs as to socially acceptable family
structures for childrearing. “ ‘[T]he relationships
among persons constituting one economic unit and
sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with [the
purposes of the Food Stamp Act,] their abilities to
stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing
farm surpluses, or with their personal nutritional
requirements.” Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (quoting U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 345 F. Supp. 310, 313
(D.D.C. 1972)).
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For example, a military wives group at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, was told that it could not admit the wife of a lesbian
officer because DOMA forbids recognition of same-sex marriages
by any federal government entity. The Associated Press, Wife of
Female Army Officer Can Join Spouses Club, USA Today (Jan.
26, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/01/26/army-military-bragg-gay/1866019/.
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Moreover, the animating impulse behind DOMA,
even when families with children are at issue, is not
consonant with the purposes and functions of many of
the federal programs that it affects. For example,
DOMA distorts the Social Security survivor benefits
program, “the primary purpose [of which] is to pay
benefits in accordance with the probable needs of the
beneficiaries,” based on the “years worked and amount
earned by a covered employee.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 644, 647 (1975); see also Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169 (1972)
(“[T]he fact of a child’s birth out of wedlock bore no
reasonable relation to the purpose of wrongful-death
statutes which compensate children for the death of a
mother.”).
Petitioner’s attempt to reframe the motivation
behind DOMA into a neutral one designed to incentivize heterosexual couples to marry, rather than to
demean married same-sex couples, smacks of rationalizing an attempt “to mandate [Congress’] own moral
code.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 850 (1992). The exclusion of same-sex
couples from recognition as married will not affect
whatever incentives may succeed in influencing the
behavior of heterosexual couples.33 As this Court
33

Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home
Affairs 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) para. 56 (S. Afr.) (finding “there is no
rational connection between the exclusion of same-sex life
partners from the benefits under [South African law] and the
government interest sought to be achieved thereby, namely the
(Continued on following page)
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noted in response to a similarly illogical argument:
“Nor can it be thought . . . that persons will shun
illicit relations because the offspring may not one day
reap the benefits of workmen’s compensation.” Weber,
406 U.S. at 173.
DOMA’s impact on children is even more discontinuous with BLAG’s asserted aims, as its only effect
is to harm the children of married same-sex couples
by denying them the benefits to which they would
otherwise be entitled. Of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) persons, 49% of women and 19%
of men are raising a child.34 Same-sex couples with
children are nearly twice as likely as non-LGBT persons with children to report household incomes near
the poverty threshold of $24,000 per year.35 Some
portion of these children are rendered ineligible by
DOMA for benefits that they would otherwise receive,
because their parents’ marriage is not recognized
under federal law.
BLAG’s claim that DOMA is justified by an
interest in federal uniformity regarding marriage recognition also suffers from discontinuity with DOMA’s
actual effects. That is, the purported interest in uniformity fails equal protection’s baseline requirement
protection of families and the family life of heterosexual spouses”).
34
Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United States, The
Williams Institute (2013), available at http://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf.
35
Id.
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that a legitimate explanation exists for burdening
some people but not others. Notably, the invocation of
a benign-sounding concern for uniformity in an
attempt to justify restricting the rights of lesbians
and gay men is not new. In Romer, the defenders of
Colorado’s ban on civil rights laws for gay people
similarly argued that they were merely trying to
achieve a uniform approach to sexual orientation
laws in the state. See Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *3 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14,
1993). But, just as “uniformity” could not adequately
explain why Colorado restricted only gay rights
measures, so too it cannot explain why the federal
government accepts the variability and dis-uniformity
among state marriage laws except vis-à-vis same-sex
couples. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)
(describing marriage as “a virtually exclusive province of the States”).
The same is true for cost-savings. While the government no doubt has a legitimate interest in saving
money, the question for equal protection purposes is
whether that interest can explain the refusal to
recognize same-sex couples’ marriages or whether
that goal is too discontinuous with the burden DOMA
imposes. Cost-savings could arguably justify any government action, but, as with uniformity, there is no
nexus between this rationale and the trait targeted
by DOMA. Without that linkage, the designation of
same-sex couples to serve the government’s fiscal
interest lacks any neutral justification. Saving money
“ ‘cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification,’ ”
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this Court has explained. Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)). Nor can it transform a
sweeping federal ban on recognition of same-sex
couples’ marriages, replete with numerous laws that
have no relation to federal spending, into a measure
tailored to prevent the extension of certain financial
benefits for married couples who had not previously
enjoyed them. Cf. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (“find[ing] it
impossible to credit” the state’s “interest in conserving resources” as an explanation for why it had
banned legal protection only for gay people); Plyler,
457 U.S. at 227 (similarly rejecting cost-savings
argument).
Tradition, too, lacks the explanatory power
required by equal protection. If tradition for its own
sake could justify the government’s burdening of
particular classes, particularly when there is a history
of governmental discrimination against the group
that is now recognized as improper, virtually all
historically-rooted classifications could be sustained.
For this reason, the Court has repeatedly rejected the
tradition rationale. Cf. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
327 (1993) (“Ancient lineage of a legal concept does
not give it immunity from attack for lacking a rational basis.”); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 18 (1991) (“[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor
the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence
to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack . . . .” (alterations in original) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).

39
In the end, DOMA “classifies [lawfully married]
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end
but to make them unequal to everyone else. This
[Congress] cannot do.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae urge this
Court to affirm the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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